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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper is a critical survey and discussion of the recent literature on
the tax effects on corporate finance and investment decisions. It corrects
a common misinterpretation of the "new" view, emphasizes the cushion-
ing effect of financial optimization, dismisses the view that optimizing
firms behave as if they maximized their cost of finance, studies the role
of immature firms, questions the alleged support of the old view by the
occurrence of share repurchases, comments on the U.S. budget compro-
mise, and suggests the idea of a political Miller equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Economists agree that the cost of capital is an important analytical tool
for predicting a country's intersectoral distortions, its growth perfor-
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mance, or its attractiveness for international capital. However, there is
no consensus as to how the tax influence on the cost of capital should be
measured.
The cost of capital is defined as the minimum pretax rate of return an
investment project must earn to be profitable. The controversy among
tax economists is primarily concerned with the question of how the
required rate of return is affected by personal and corporate income
taxation, and the double taxation of dividends has received particular
attention. While it is obvious that the double taxation creates a substan-
tial tax burden for corporations, there is no agreement as to how much of
the burden falls on marginal investment projects. The "old view" is that
the total tax burden falls entirely on marginal investment projects and
therefore implies a high cost of capital, far above the market rate of
interest. By way of contrast, the so-called "new view" (which, in fact, is
no longer so new) is that only the tax burden on retained earnings
matters. The burden of the double taxation of dividends is seen to fall
largely on inframarginal investment projects and is believed to have no
effect on the cost of capital at the margin.
This note is an exposition and critical review of some of the arguments
exchanged between the members of the two schools. It presents the
basic theories, discusses the role of financial optimization, comments on
immature firms, and includes an analysis of the role of share repur-
chases, attention to which has recently led to a revival of the "old" view
among North American economists. It also presents the idea of a politi-
cal Miller equilibrium.
The crucial reason for the different views on the way taxes affect the cost
of capital is that authors make different assumptions about the firms'
financial decisions, sometimes without explicitly mentioning them. The
holders of the new view have pointed to the importance of these assump-
tions and they have emphasized that new share issues, debt, and, in
particular, retained profits should be distinguished as alternative sources
of finance. Three different cost of capital expressions are typically used by
them, depending on which source of finance is assumed.
Equally important, however, is the distinction between alternative
uses of profits. These uses are not only dividend and interest payments, as
is usually assumed, but also profit retentions and share repurchases.
The specification of the use of profits is as essential for the calculation of
the cost of capital as the specification of the source of finance. Only
when it is clear where an additional dollar used for investment comes
from and where its returns are going, is it possible to calculate the tax
burden on marginal investment and to find out which minimum pretax
return is required to make this investment profitable.Taxation and the Cost of Capital 27
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"Sufficient conditions derived in Sinn (1988b, 1990).
Distinguishing retained earnings, debt, and new share issues as mar-
ginal sources of finance and retentions, dividends, interest income, and
share repurchases as marginal uses of profit in principle gives up to 12
different expressions for the cost of capital. However, since interest pay-
ments are the marginal use of profits only when the marginal source of
finance is debt, the number reduces to 7. The possibilities are depicted in
Table 1. As will be shown, not all of them will be equally relevant to an
optimizing firm: however, they will turn out to be a useful guide in the
course of this paper.
II. THE OLD VIEW
In the good old days economists distinguished just two financial alterna-
tives: equity and debt, and equity was seen as being provided by the
household sector. The term "old view" will be used to characterize this
approach.
With equity finance, the conceptual experiment for determining the
cost of capital was that shareholders inject an additional dollar into their
firm by purchasing newly issued shares and compare the returns in the
form of dividends with the returns they could have received by invest-
ing their money in bonds. Let TT be the annual dividend from marginal
investment of one dollar and i the annual rate of interest on bonds.
Then, if there are no taxes, the shareholders would be willing to inject
funds into their firm until, at the margin, TT = i.
If taxes are levied, the decision is different. Suppose distributed earn-28 Sinn
ings are subject to a corporate tax of rate rd and in addition to a personal
tax of rate rdp/ the frequently deplored "double tax." Assume that inter-
est income on the other hand is taxed only once at the personal rate T;. In
this case, the marginal investment project is determined by equality of
the dividend net of all taxes and the net-of-personal tax interest rate:
TT(1—Td)(l—rdp) = z(l—T;). In all OECD countries except Norway the per-
sonal tax on dividends is the same as that on interest income: rdp = T;.
The equation can therefore be simplified to TT(1—rd) = i or, solving for TT,
to
(i)
The right side of this equation is the pretax rate of return the firm must
earn—that is, its cost of capital. This is represented in the box in the first
column and first row of Table 1.
If the formula were true, the cost of capital would exceed the rate of
interest significantly. Before 1986, when the U.S. corporate tax rate was
46%, the cost of capital would have exceeded the interest rate by 85%
and presently, with a corporate tax rate of 34%, it would exceed the
interest rate by 52%.
Clearly this signals substantial economic distortions. Too much of the
available aggregate stock of capital would be allocated to the noncor-
porate sectors or to countries that do not impose a corporate tax on
dividends (such as Norway, Germany, or Italy). Aggregate output
would be lower than in the case where all investment projects had to
satisfy the same profitability requirements. This is the traditional or
"old" view of the role of corporate taxation that can be attributed to
Harberger (1962, 1966) and McLure (1979) and, in an international con-
text, to MacDougall (1960), Kemp (1962, 1964), and Hamada (1966).
It was clear to these authors that the cost of capital would be lower if
firms could escape the double taxation of equity returns by choosing
debt as the source of finance. An early writer who emphasized this point
was Oberhauser (1963, pp. 67-68). He argued that, because of the de-
ductibility of debt interest, a debt-financed marginal investment project
is not affected by the tax rates and the cost of capital is simply equal to
the market rate of interest. For a debt financed investment project, the
dividend net of interest payments and net of all taxes is (TT-I) (1-Td)
(1 —rdp). Obviously, the taxes reduce this dividend when it is positive,
but they do not make it negative. All investment projects which are
worth being carried out in the absence of taxation therefore retain this
property despite taxation andTaxation and the Cost of Capital 29
77 = i (2)
remains the marginal investment condition. This is the case captured by
the box in the third row and second column of Table 1.
Debt financing is an important example of a situation where the corpo-
rate tax is a burden on inframarginal, but not on marginal, investment
projects. Only inframarginal projects generate profits in excess of their
interest cost; only they pay the tax. Marginal debt financed projects that
just break even are tax exempt. This is the reason why, under debt
finance, the set of profitable investment projects is not affected by the
corporate tax and the cost of capital equals the interest rate. The neutral-
ity of the corporate tax in the case of debt financing has been emphasized
by many authors and is well accepted by holders of the "old" view of
corporate taxation. Often the literature takes account of the role of debt
financing by assuming that the cost of capital is a weighted average of
equations (1) and (2).
III. THE NEW VIEW
One of the problems with the "old" view is that it rests heavily on the
assumption that new share issues are the marginal source of equity
finance. This assumption does not harmonize well with the empirical
fact that most corporate equity capital is generated by internal invest-
ment rather than new share issues. For example, in the period from 1980
to 1985, an average 67.8% of gross investment by U.S. nonfinancial
corporations was internally financed, 31.0% was debt financed, and only
1.2% was financed with share issues.
1 Contrary to the assumption of the
holders of the old view, these data suggest that corporations are self-
perpetuating enterprises that rarely rely on equity injections by share-
holder households but generate the needed equity capital primarily
through profit retentions.
Probably the first to analyze the cost of capital consistently in the case
of profit retentions was King (1974a,b, 1977). His contributions initiated
a new literature that includes the contributions of Bradford (1980, 1981),
Auerbach (1979, 1983), Fullerton and King (1984), Edwards and Keen
(1984), Sinn (1985), and many others. The common element of this litera-
ture, which soon was labeled the "new view," was that it allowed with-
1 See Survey of Current Business, volumes 57 (July 1977, p. 24n.), 61 (1981, special supple-
ment, p. 10), 63 (July 1983, p. 30), 66 (July 1986, p. 33); and Federal Reserve Bulletin,
Volumes 55 (November 1969, p. A 71.4), 60 (October 1974, p. A 59.4), 64 (June 1978, p.
433), 65 (December 1979, p. A 44). For a more extensive record see Gertler and Hubbard
(1990, Table 1).30 Sinn
held dividends to replace new share issues as a marginal source of equity
finance.
The modification is important in all cases where the personal tax on
capital gains differs from that on dividends and where different corpo-
rate tax rates are applied to retained and distributed earnings. Let rr be
the corporate tax rate on retained profits, rd (as before) the corporate tax
on distributed profits, and TC the personal capital gains tax rate. In the
classical system of corporate taxation that prevails in the United States
and a few smaller countries (Australia, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Switzerland), rr equals Td; there is only one corporate tax rate
regardless of whether earnings are retained or distributed. However, in
nearly all other OECD countries, rr exceeds rd because imputation sys-
tems are used which refund part of the corporate tax to shareholders.
The statutory capital gains tax rate in the United States is currently—
however, perhaps not for much longer—equal to the personal tax rate,
but it is applied only to realized rather than accrued capital gains. It is a
widely used approximation to model this preferential treatment by as-
suming an effective tax on accrued capital gains whose rate is smaller
than the personal tax rate: rc < T;. A good guess is that, in the United
States, rc is currently half the personal tax rate where the latter can be
taken to be 28% for the typical shareholder.
2 In most other countries, the
difference between TC and Ti is even more pronounced for the simple
reason that these countries do not have any personal capital gains tax
rates worth mentioning. Currently, only one-third of the OECD coun-
tries impose personal taxes on capital gains that are realized after a
holding period of more than one year!
Verbally deriving the cost of capital expression for the case where
retained earnings is the source of finance is slightly more arduous than
in the case where new share issues or debt are the sources of finance.
Nevertheless the argument is straightforward. Consider a firm that de-
cides to finance additional investment by retaining earnings and thus
foregoing a potential dividend payment. From the shareholders' point of
view, this policy is worthwhile if its rate of return on investment is
sufficiently high to generate future dividends in excess of the interest
income that they would have earned had they received the current divi-
dend payment and invested it in bonds. The minimum pretax rate of
return necessary to satisfy the shareholders is the cost of capital to the
firm.
To calculate this cost of capital, it is important to realize that the
2 In inflationary times, TC may, however, become larger, since nominal rather than real
capital gains are taxed.Taxation and the Cost of Capital 31
decision to retain more profits creates more capital gains and raises the
shareholders' capital gains tax liability. Suppose, in toto, one dollar is
given up by the shareholders in the form of additional capital gains
taxes to be paid and net-of-tax dividends foregone. If all market partici-
pants know what is going on, this renunciation must be offset by an
increase in the market value of shares by exactly one dollar. Thus the
additional capital gains taxes equal rc and the foregone dividend net of
the personal and corporate dividend taxes equals 1—rc. "Grossing up"
the foregone dividend with the corporate and personal dividend taxes
rd and Tdp translates it into (1—rc)/[(l-rd)(l—rdp)] units of before-tax prof- its or, after subtracting the corporate tax on retained earnings, into
investable funds of size (l-rc)(l-rr)/[(l-Td)(l-Tdp)]. On the other side of the ledger, the flow of net-of-tax dividends resulting from this invest-
ment outlay has to be determined. If one additional dollar were in-
vested in the firm, the resulting before-tax return would be IT and the
corresponding net-of-all-tax dividend flow would be 77(1—Td)(l-rdp). In
this case, however, the additional amount invested is not one dollar
but (l-Tc)(l-rr)/[(l-Td)(l-Tdp)] dollars. Hence the resulting net-of-all- taxes dividend flow is {(l-Tc)(l-Tr)/[(l-rd)(l-rdp)]} • TT (l-rd)(l-rdp) or simply TT(1 —rc)(l—Tr). Comparing this amount with the interest income
that the shareholders could have earned by not giving up the dollar but
investing it in the capital market results in the break even condition
7r(l — TC)(1—rr) = i(l — TJ. The solution of this condition for IT yields the
expression for the cost of capital which was sought:
This is the value represented by the box in the second row and first
column of Table 1.
With current U.S. tax rates of, say, r; = 0.28, rr = 0.34, and rc - 0.14, the
cost of capital implied by equation (3) would be 27% above the interest rate
vs. 52% according to the old view. This still signals economic distortions,
but, with the usual quadratic excess burden functions, the welfare loss
from intersectoral distortions would only be one-fourth of that implied by
the old view. Before 1986, when the maximum marginal personal tax rate
(50%) exceeded the corporate tax rate (46%) and the effective tax rate on
accrued capital gains may have been about one-fifth of the personal tax
rate, it was even possible that (1—rc) (1—rr) ~ 1 - T;. With this constellation,
the cost of equity finance would have equalled the interest rate under the
"new" view, whereas, as argued above, it would have exceeded this rate
by 85% under the "old" view.32 Sinn
In most OECD countries, including those in continental Europe, the
practical nonexistence of capital gains taxes implies that equation (3)
reduces to
77 = i - (European case)
l-rr
and the relative magnitudes of the personal and corporate tax rates alone
determine the cost of capital. In the special case where both tax rates are
equal, the tax system operates like a pure Schanz-Haig-Simons tax
3 and
the cost of capital equals the interest rate—as if debt rather than retained
earnings were the marginal source of finance. Basically, this is the fundamen-
tal neutrality result that European tax economists call the Johansson-
Samuelson Theorem.*
The role of the personal income tax rate r; in equation (3) merits particu-
lar attention. Holders of the "old" view often argue that the corporate tax
is a tax on investment and the personal income tax one on savings,
largely irrelevant for the "investment wedge" as measured by the differ-
ence between the pretax rate of return to capital and the market rate of
interest. In their opinion, all the personal tax does is create a "savings
wedge" between the market rate of interest and the net rate of return the
saver receives, but it has no implications for the investment tax wedge.
Under the "new" view this argument seems highly misleading because
equation (3) shows that both taxes are equally important for the invest-
ment tax wedge, perfectly offsetting each other when the tax rates are
equal. It is true under the "new" view that the corporate tax is a tax on
real investment and that the personal income tax is a tax on savings.
However, the personal income tax is also seen as a subsidy on real
investment because it reduces the opportunity cost of funds retained in
the firm—after all, equation (3) was derived from a portfolio consider-
ation where the shareholders' personal investment in bonds was com-
pared with their company's investment in real assets. The higher the
personal tax rate, the smaller is the investment tax wedge and the larger
the firm's optimal level of investment with any given market rate of
interest.
3 On the definition and origins of this tax see Goode (1977).
4 See Sinn (1985, Ch. 5) for further details. The theorem also gives a precise definition of
true economic depreciation. When depreciation for tax purposes is accelerated relative to
true economic depreciation, the cost of capital falls short of the interest rate, and, with an
immediate write off, the cost of capital equals the rate of return the saver receives, i(l —TJ).
By way of contrast, under the "old" view of corporate taxation, the cost of capital with
immediate depreciation equals the interest rate, i.Taxation and the Cost of Capital 33
Apart from the fact that it implies lower intertemporal and inter-
sectoral distortions than suggested by the "old" view, this particular role
of the personal income tax results in paradoxical changes in the alloca-
tion of the available aggregate capital stock. An increase in the personal
income tax rate for owners of corporate shares induces a reallocation of
the aggregate stock of capital from the noncorporate to the corporate
sector regardless of whether it is matched by a tax increase for the
owners of noncorporate firms. And, provided the OECD's residence
rules for the taxation of international interest income flows are kept, a
unilateral increase in one country's personal income tax rate will induce
capital imports. The higher the personal income tax rate, the more prof-
its will be retained by domestic companies for the purpose of internal
investment and the less capital is available for reinvestment in the capital
market. The shortage of funds boosts the domestic interest rate and
attracts foreign capital. Via a revaluation of the domestic currency and
the subsequent current account deficit, the foreign capital succeeds in
entering the domestic economy and makes an increase in aggregate
domestic investment possible (see Sinn, 1988a, 1989).
It is obvious from equation (3) that capital gains taxes are the counter-
part of personal taxes on interest income. A cut in the capital gains tax
rate brings about the same portfolio effect as an increase in the personal
tax rate does. The "compensation" of a cut in the capital gains tax rate
with an increase in the personal income tax rate that has recently been
considered as a potential U.S. budget compromise between Republicans
and Democrats would therefore be strongly nonneutral with regard to
international capital movements. It would create domestic investment
incentives, raise the U.S. interest rate, support the dollar, and increase
the American current account deficit.
An important aspect of equation (3) is that no dividend taxes appear
in it. Economists have often been misled by this aspect into believing
that the equation refers to the case where the profits generated by the
marginal investment project (TT) are retained in order to avoid the high
burden of dividend taxes. In fact, holders of the "old" view often
assume that equation (3) is the appropriate formula for the case where
all proceeds of an investment are retained; and they often use a
weighted average of equations (1) and (3) where the weights are de-
termined by the dividend-payout ratio.
5 Unfortunately, however, it
5 Cf. Miller (1977, pp. 266-267), Gordon and Malkiel (1981, pp. 141-143), or, to refer to
more recent examples, Bernheim and Shoven (1987, 1989). On p. 18 of their 1989 article,
the latter argue that, in the King-Fullerton model, "net earnings flowing from an invest-
ment financed with retained earnings must be entirely retained," deplore this assumption
as counterfactual, and then seek greater generality by allowing the use of profits to be34 Sinn
seems that the formula has never been consistently derived from an
optimization approach that would justify such a use or interpretation
and, in fact, Section V will raise doubts that it ever can be derived.
6
Under the "new" view, the true interpretation of equation (3) is not
that the profits from the marginal investment project are retained but,
on the contrary, that they are fully distributed in the form of dividends.
The message of the new view is not that the dividend taxes are neutral
when the firm avoids them, but that they are neutral when, and in an
important sense even because, it pays them. This exemplifies the more
general point that the cost of capital depends as critically on the use of
profits as on the source of finance.
The very fact that the firm pays dividends and dividend taxes in the
investment phase implies that the marginal investment project is subsi-
dized at the rate 1 —(1 —rd) (1 —rdp), which is the same rate at which its
returns are taxed. This symmetry explains why the dividend taxes drop
out of the equation and why they are neutral. The personal and corpo-
rate taxes on retained earnings that do appear on the right-hand side of
equation (3) are not the taxes on the profits generated by the marginal
investment project, they are taxes on the funds invested. This aspect is
determined by an exogenous dividend-payout ratio. This ratio is used to calculate the
weighted average expression mentioned. Admittedly, Fullerton and King's (1984, p. 23)
derivation of equation (3) can indeed be misunderstood, because they begin their discus-
sion of the retained earnings case with the marginal condition TT(1 — TC)(1 — rr) = i(l — TJ,
which above was merely the last step in a chain of transformations. There can be no doubt,
however, that only the interpretation given here reflects the literature summarized under
the heading "new view" adequately—including the work of King and Fullerton. For for-
mal proofs of equation (3) in the context of explicit optimization models of the firm that
support this interpretation see Sinn (1985, Ch. 5, and 1989, appendix).
6 Section VIIA will show, however, that equation (3) can also be derived in the case where
the marginal profits are used for share repurchases and where new share issues are the
source of finance. Note, moreover, that the equation is compatible with retentions where
these are equivalent to dividend payments. The point that will be made in Section V is that
equation (3) is inappropriate when retentions are preferred to dividend payments, because
then the marginal value of equity, q, cannot be a constant [cf. equation (6) below].
To the best of my knowledge the consistently derived expression that comes closest to
the weighted average of equations (1) and (3) is Poterba and Summers's (1985) equation
(my notation)
where p is the shareholders' discount rate, T = rr = rd, and a is the dividend-payout ratio.
Poterba and Summers's equation is not a weighted average of (1) and (3) since p is assumed
to deviate from the net-of-tax interest rate i(l-Tj) by an amount that is inversely related to
the dividend-payout ratio a. Moreover, these authors do not assume that marginal profits
are retained. They assume that marginal profits are paid out in the form of share repur-
chases and dividends.Taxation and the Cost of Capital 35
often overlooked, but it is obvious from the arbitrage calculus presented
and it is essential for the new view.
The deeper economic reason for the neutrality of the dividend taxes is
that dividend taxes are cash flow taxes that make the government a
silent partner in the business. From the viewpoint of a single share-
holder the government is very similar to another shareholder who
claims a constant fraction of the distributed profits but does not make
effective use of his voting rights. It is true that, unlike other sharehold-
ers, the government may have received its partnership in an unfair
manner by establishing the tax law, but for a dividend paying firm this is
merely a part of its miserable history. It is not an aspect that gives the
shareholders incentives to vote for a policy other than the one they
would prefer if they could claim the tax-inclusive fraction of dividends.
The neutrality properties of taxes on corporate distributions were em-
phasized by Bradford (1981) and induced the Meade Committee (1978)
to propose a dividend tax as the only tax on corporate profits. Many
economists believe that such taxes are among the most neutral ones
available.
Although holders of the "new" view may have different opinions
about the introduction of a dividend tax, most of them would object to
the abolition of existing dividend taxes. They would argue that this
abolition would reduce tax revenue, would create unjustified windfall
gains for those who currently happen to hold their wealth in corporate
shares, and would not induce firms to deviate from the investment
behavior described by equation (3). The case is not as hypothetical as it
may seem. A major reason for Congress not following the Treasury
Department's (1985) proposal to integrate the corporate and personal tax
systems in the course of the 1986 reform was the fear that this integra-
tion would incur substantial revenue losses without promising signifi-
cant efficiency gains.
7
IV. FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY AND REAL
DISTORTIONS
The existence of at least three alternative cost-of-capital expressions
poses severe problems for economic models designed to measure tax
distortions, for the magnitude of the predicted distortions will obviously
depend on the financial behavior assumed. Ideally, the financial behav-
ior should be determined endogenously together with the firm's invest-
7 This was communicated to the author by Charles McLure, the academic supervisor of the
proposal.36 Sinn
ment behavior, and the cost of financial and real distortions should be
aggregated to overall welfare measures. However, in the absence of
sound theories of the firms' financial choices, this approach has rarely
been taken in the literature and no simple solutions have been offered so
far.
8
Holders of the "old" view often solve the problem by neglecting it.
Frequently, they simply run their models on the basis of equation (1),
finding huge real distortions and writing alarming reports about the
devastating effects of the tax system. The results are not overly surpris-
ing if one realizes that, with the classical system of corporate taxation,
they are based on the implicit assumption that firms maximize their cost
of finance.
A more promising approach may be that of Fullerton and King (1984).
These authors provide a methodology for measuring tax distortions that
is probably now the most frequently used by research institutes and tax
authorities throughout the world. They assume that the cost of capital is
a weighted average of the costs of debt, retained earnings, and new
share issues where the weights are the fractions of debt, surplus capital,
and original capital in a firm's assets. The King-Fullerton methodology
has been criticized on the grounds that it equates average with marginal
financial structures and imposes these structures exogenously on the
firm.
Another possibility is Sinn's (1985) approach, which is based on the
assumption that firms minimize their cost of finance subject to the con-
straint that a minimum marginal equity-asset ratio is required. The re-
sulting cost of capital in this approach is a weighted average of the cost
of debt finance and the lower of the cost of internal and external equity
finance. Naturally, the economic distortions it predicts tend to be lower
than those suggested by old-view models or models of the King-
Fullerton variety. The approach includes an endogenous explanation of
the equity-asset ratio along the lines suggested by DeAngelo and
Masulis (1980). Among other things this explanation implies that the
equity-asset ratio increases with the allowed acceleration of tax deprecia-
tion and with the firm's planned rate of growth.
The constrained cost-of-capital minimization approach rests on the
assumption that the firm pays dividends and retains profits only to
finance its investment in real assets. For a firm that does not pay divi-
dends, the cost of capital may be determined according to different
rules.
One reason for not paying dividends is the existence of a tax system
8 Cf. Miller (1977), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), and Gordon and Malkiel (1981).Taxation and the Cost of Capital 37
that favors retentions over debt since (1-TC) (l-rr) > l-^.
9 Stiglitz (1973)
believed that such a system prevailed in the United States before the
1981 tax reform and he argued that it would induce firms to use the part
of profits exceeding their real investment for financial investments in the
capital market. A marginal decision to invest in real assets would under
these circumstances require a reduction in the capital market investment
and, as this would be equivalent to marginal debt finance, the cost of
capital would equal the market rate of interest. Taxes on the returns from
equity capital do not matter in this approach even though all real invest-
ment is equity financed.
Stiglitz's argument was recently used in the work of Howitt and Sinn
(1989) who analyzed investment in the case of anticipated changes in
dividend tax rates. These changes resulted in strong changes in the
firm's financial behavior, but left its real investment unaffected. The cost
of capital was invariant to tax rate changes.
The result emerging from this discussion is that the firms' financial
flexibility is crucial for the amount of real distortions a tax system causes.
Obviously, the financial decisions can serve as a cushion that protects
the economy from the blows imposed by the tax system. The higher the
degree of financial flexibility, the easier it is for firms to escape discrimi-
natory taxation and the lower are the real distortions.
1
0 Models that are
built on the assumptions of fixed financial structures, or even of maximiz-
ing the cost of finance, may miss an important economic self-protection
device and are likely to overstate the economy's distortions.
V. DO FIRMS MAXIMIZE THEIR COST OF CAPITAL?
Although the old view's assumption that firms maximize their cost of
capital may at first look awkward to say the least, this assumption has
recently been defended by Hansson and Stuart (1985) with an interesting
argument. The argument rests on the widespread view that, unlike eq-
uity finance, debt finance involves invisible costs that, in a financial
optimum, just compensate for its tax advantages at the margin (see
Gordon and Malkiel, 1981). The invisible costs are similar to the costs of
rent seeking in public choice models and can, for example, be taken to
represent the cost of avoiding bankruptcy or, more generally, the differ-
9 Another reason is that the firm may not have enough profits. See Section VI for an
analysis of this case.
1
0 Fullerton and Mackie (1989) estimate the welfare implications of the 1986 U.S. tax reform
alternatively under the "new" and "old" view. Although their formal specification of these
views is not exactly compatible with the interpretation given in this paper, they find that
the "old" view implies larger distortions than the "new" view.38 Sinn
ential transactions costs resulting from the use of debt in lieu of equity
capital. According to Hansson and Stuart, the presence of these costs
implies that, although firms actually minimize their cost of finance, they
make their real investment decisions as if they maximized the cost of
finance with regard to the visible costs and as if they used only equity at
the margin.
If correct, this argument would help rehabilitate models that neglect
the role of financial decisions and would constitute a strong criticism of
all models that allow for financial flexibility or that assume the cost of
capital to be a weighted average of the direct, visible costs of different
sources of finance.
To check the argument, neglect the difference between external and
internal equity finance and assume that the invisible cost of debt finance
can be described by a function (p(K,D) where K is the firm's stock of
assets and D its debt.
1
1 Let e be the visible cost of equity finance as given
in equation (1) or (3) and i the (visible) cost of debt financing as given in
equation (2). Assume that the tax system favors debt over equity and
that i < e. An interior solution of the debt-equity choice that captures
the Hansson-Stuart view is presumably characterized by
e = i + <pD (4)
where <pD is the marginal invisible cost of debt finance. The equation
expresses that the sum of the marginal visible and invisible costs of debt
finance equals the visible cost of equity, as the authors maintained.
However does this mean that the cost of capital is equal to the cost of
equity capital el
Probably not. The general condition for an optimal marginal invest-
ment is that its rate of return, IT, be equal to the marginal visible cost of a
source of finance plus the marginal invisible cost where, because of the
interior solution, it does not matter which source is chosen. Consider the




ir = e + <pK (5)
with <pK as the change in the invisible cost resulting from a marginal
equity-financed increase in the cost of capital.
1
1 For a more detailed analysis see Sinn (1987).
1
2 In the case of debt financing the marginal investment condition is 77 = i + <pD + <pK,
which, because of equation (4), is the same as equation (5).Taxation and the Cost of Capital 39
According to equation (5), the Hansson-Stuart proposition that IT - e
is correct if, and only if, <pK = 0. This, however, is a problematic assump-
tion. If the invisible costs reflect bankruptcy or agency costs, as the
authors suggested, then it seems very plausible that an increase in the
firm's stock of equity reduces these costs and that <pK < 0. If it were
indeed true that <pK = 0 for all levels of D, then the cross derivatives <pKD
and <pDK would both be zero and the stock of debt that satisfies equation
(4) would be independent of the firm's stock of assets. The firm could
grow indefinitely, but there would never be an incentive to use more
debt. Obviously, the Hansson-Stuart argument rests on the implicit
assumption that equity is the only marginal source of finance. It is not
surprising then that the cost of finance is not a weighted average of the
costs of debt and equity finance, but equals the latter.
If these implausible implications are removed by using the more realis-
tic assumption <pK < 0 (and <pDK < 0), then, despite the interior debt equity
choice, the cost of capital is between the costs of debt and equity, just as
weighted average models predict. Even in a Hansson-Stuart world,
firms do not behave as if they were maximizing their cost of finance,
they behave as if the weighted average formulations were correct!
VI. THE ROLE OF IMMATURE FIRMS
It is certainly not reasonable to expect firms that have access to alterna-
tive sources of finance to behave as if they were maximizing their cost of
finance, but neither is it true that the most attractive sources of finance
are always available. This is obvious for debt financing, which is often
subject to tight constraints imposed by the banking system. However, it
is also true for retained earnings. Young and immature firms may not
have enough profits to finance all available investment projects profit-
able enough to bear the cost of retentions given in equation (3).
This is a severe problem for the "new" view. Even in mature econo-
mies there are always inventors who try to found corporations to cash in
on their ideas. Moreover, new investment opportunities that require
more equity funds than the firm is able to generate by withholding its
dividends show up regularly for existing firms. In all these cases the new
view is not very helpful for predicting the firm's cost of capital, because
its basic assumption that the firm can finance more investment by with-
holding more dividends is not satisfied.
At first glance this seems to rehabilitate the "old" view and its basic
cost-of-capital expression, equation (1). After all, new share issues may
be unavoidable when other sources of finance are not available. Unfortu-
nately, however, there is no reason to be optimistic. In fact there hardly40 Sinn
seem to be any circumstances where equation (1) can possibly be true for
value maximizing neoclassical firms when dividends are taxed more
heavily than retentions [(l-rd) (l-rdp) < (l-rr) (1-TC)]. The fundamental problem with equation (1) is that it is based on a
conceptual mistake. The equation is derived from the assumption that
marginal profits are paid out as dividends, but it implies that the firm
prefers to retain them. To understand this inconsistency, suppose the
firm followed equation (1) and stopped issuing shares at the point where
the last dollar invested yielded a return equal to z'/(l—rd). In this case
there would be a set of unexploited investment opportunities with a rate
of return above the cost of withheld dividends as given by equation (3).
In the presence of such opportunities, dividend payments cannot be
optimal. Instead, it is optimal for the firm to enter an extended period of
purely internal growth where it retains its profits and does not pay
dividends until all of the projects have been implemented.
To calculate the true cost of new share issues in the presence of a
phase of purely internal growth is not an easy task, and a parametric cost
of capital formula does not seem readily available. Nevertheless, it has
been shown in Sinn (1988b, 1990) that the cost of new share issues, as
well as the length of the period of internal growth, increases with an
increase in the dividend tax rate and will, under extremely mild condi-
tions, exceed the value given by the traditional formula (1).
The first of these results says that an increase in the dividend tax burden
reduces a young firm's starting stock of capital and slows down its devel-
opment to maturity. It is a potential explanation of Poterba and Sum-
mers's (1985) empirical finding that the frequent changes in the British
dividend tax rate exhibited adverse effects on aggregate investment.
1
3
The second result implies that even the "old" view underestimates the
cost of capital for newly founded firms. These firms may be endowed
with only a very small nucleus of original capital and may be forced to
generate more capital through internal investment than a focus on equa-
tions (1) and (3) would suggest. The result is the net effect of two coun-
tervailing forces. On the one hand, the deferral of dividend payments
reduces the present value of the firm's tax burden. This, in itself, would
reduce the cost of capital if there were unlimited internal investment
1
3 The authors' own explanation is a signaling argument. According to this argument, an
increase in the dividend tax rate reduces the optimal volume of dividends which in turn
increases the shareholders' discount rate (cf. also fn. 6). A third explanation could simply
be that, for at least some of the periods considered, the overall tax burden on dividends fell
short of that on retentions. In this case new issues of shares would be the cheapest source
of equity finance and it would not be surprising that dividend taxes entered the cost of
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opportunities that the firm could use up to a predetermined point of
time.
1
4 On the other hand, the possibility of generating "cheap" capital
through profit retentions makes it wise to economize on new share
issues and to start with only a nucleus of equity capital if the set of
internal investment opportunities is limited and the time of dividend
payments is endogenously determined. New share issues reduce the
scope of profitable retentions, and this reduction is an opportunity cost
that increases the cost of external equity funds beyond the value implied
by the traditional equation (1). Table 1 reports this result in the box that
is in the first row and third column.
The phase of internal growth, which should necessarily follow the
issue of new shares, is a phase in which the firm neither issues new
shares nor pays any dividends and in which retentions are both the only
source of finance and the only use of profits. The careless holder of the
new view who focuses simply on the firm's marginal source of funds
might interpret this phase as one in which the firm's cost of capital is
given by equation (3). Similarly, the careless holder of the old view might
do the same because he focuses on the firm's use of profits and inter-
prets equation (3) in the "old" way described in Section III (shortly after
presenting the equation). However, they would both be wrong. As long
as there is a strict preference for profit retentions, the firm's marginal
investment projects will obviously have a rate of return above the value
given by equation (3), and the economic distortions will be larger than
this value suggests.
Formally, the phase of internal growth can be shown to result in a
decline in q, the firm's marginal value of equity, from one to (1 — rd)(l — rdp)/
[(1 — rr)(l—rc)], the value that the new view predicts for a dividend paying
firm.
1
5 This decline is a capital loss that increases the cost of capital beyond
the value given by equation (3). Let q measure the annual increment of q, q
being negative in the phase of internal growth. A shareholder whose only
1
4 This is the argument that those who argue that the mere possibility of a deferral of
dividend payments reduces the cost of capital may have in mind. The argument covers
only one side of the problem.
1
5 The variable q is the increase in the firm's market value resulting from a one dollar gift to
the firm. Its value equals one when the firm issues new shares because the gift would be
able to substitute a one dollar equity injection by the shareholders. To understand that q =
(l-rd)(l-Td )/[(l-Tr)(l-Tc)] if the firm pays dividends recall the arbitrage calculus given in Section III. There it was shown that one dollar that the shareholders give up in the form of
dividend reductions and capital gains tax increases translates into investable funds equal to
(1-Tc)(l-Tr)/[(1-Tdp)(l-Td)]. The inverse of this expression is the cash shareholders would receive if the gift were distributed or, equivalently, the capital gain they could enjoy if the
gift were retained. See Auerbach (1979) for an early analysis of q in the phase of dividend
payments.42 Sinn
returns are capital gains would be indifferent between a policy of profit
retentions and a personal capital market investment if the rate of capital
gains on his shares equalled the net-of-tax interest rate, i.e., if (1 — rc)
[7r(l-Tr) + q/q] = (l-Tj)i. Solving for IT, the pretax rate of return to real
capital, one obtains the following modified cost-of-capital expression:
1
6
1 — T; q/q
77 = I
 l ~ (6)
(1-Tc)(l-Tr) 1-Tr
As q/q < 0, this expression indicates a higher cost of capital and higher
distortions than equation (3). Its entry in Table 1 is in the second row and
third column.
The work reported in this section has implications for the empirical
literature on the tax influence on the cost of capital. Among others,
two conclusions emerge. The first is that "new view" approaches of
the King-Fullerton variety tend to underestimate the true cost of capi-
tal. These approaches use weighted averages of expressions (l)-(3) but
do not take account of the facts that, when firms are immature, the
cost of new share issues is likely to exceed the value given in equation
(1) and the cost of retained earnings is likely to exceed that given in
equation (3).
The second conclusion refers to "old view" approaches of the Har-
berger variety. It is the tradition of these approaches to explain the
magnitudes of real distortions with the measurable income tax burden
or, what amount to the same thing, to assume the cost of capital to be a
weighted average of equations (1) and (3) where the dividend-payout
ratio is used to construct the weights. In view of the above analysis of
immature firms this procedure stands truth on its head. A high measur-
able tax burden signals that many firms are mature and pay dividends.
The cost of capital is low, because investment can be financed with
dividend reductions. On the other hand, a low dividend-payout ratio
and a low measurable tax burden signal a shortage of funds. It means
that many firms face the high cost of retained earnings as given by
equation (6) or even a cost of new share issues in excess of the traditional
value given in equation (1). In short, when it comes to a comparison of
mature and immature firms, the true cost of capital is inversely related to
that measured by "old view" approaches.
1
6 See Sinn (1990). As profit retentions follow new share issues, this equation also applies
to the case of new share issues. However, in itself, it does not reveal that this cost is above
the traditional value //(l-rd). The proof that the cost of new share issues will, under mild
conditions, exceed //(l-rd) is given in Sinn (1988b, 1990). It is based on a comparison of the
time paths of the "true" q and the q implied by equation (1).Taxation and the Cost of Capital 43
VII. WHY SHARE REPURCHASES DO NOT
REHABILITATE THE "OLD VIEW"
Share repurchases and acquisitions have long constituted an important
aspect of U.S. corporate behavior. Scherer and Ravenscraft (1984) found
that, from 1950 to 1975, at least 1800 independent firms were acquired by
those 148 firms that persistently belonged to the set of the 200 largest
U.S. firms. And Shoven (1986) reported that, in the years following 1983,
corporate share repurchases, predominantly acquisitions, exceeded ordi-
nary dividend payments.
As shown in Sinn (1985, Ch. 6) the excessive acquisition activity of
U.S. firms can, in principle, be explained by the undervaluation of corpo-
rate shares resulting from the high burden of dividend taxes. Buying
shares is a cheaper way of acquiring real assets than buying investment
goods, is a method of distributing dividends that circumvents personal
income tax, and, if debt financed, is a convenient way of enjoying the tax
advantages of a higher degree of corporate leverage.
1
7
Quite surprisingly, the observation of corporate share repurchases has
recently led to a revival of the "old" view of corporate taxation among
North-American economists. The puzzling aspect about this develop-
ment in the history of economic thought is that although share repur-
chases are a way of avoiding the dividend taxes, they are nevertheless
believed to reinstate the distortionary image of these taxes.
The "naive" interpretation of the empirical fact of share repurchases is
that, if anything, they reduce the cost of capital because they constitute a
less heavily taxed use for marginal profits than dividends. Consider two
straightforward thought experiments to derive the implication of share
repurchases for the cost of capital before the "puzzle" will be addressed.
A. Share Repurchases and the Cost of Equity Capital
In the first experiment, the shareholders inject funds into their company
in exchange for newly issued shares and receive the returns by gradually
selling shares back to this company. The issue of new shares increases
the market value of all shares simply because it injects money into the
firm and has no immediate tax consequences when it occurs at the
market clearing price. However, when the firm uses its profits to repur-
chase shares there are tax consequences. Although they avoid the per-
1
7 To establish "acquisition neutrality" a removal of the affiliaton privilege or the introduc-
tion of a special tax on corporate acquisitions was recommended that under the present
U.S. tax rate would have to be 52% of the purchase volume. For further discussion of the
acquisition problem in the context of tax incentives see Poterba (1987), Auerbach and
Reishus (1988), and Bagwell and Shoven (1988).44 Sinn
sonal income tax that the shareholder household would have to pay on
ordinary dividends, the share repurchases do not prevent the firm from
having to pay corporate tax on retained earnings and they in addition
create a personal capital gains tax liability because the remaining shares
are gaining in "weight."
To derive the corresponding cost of capital expression, suppose share-
holders inject one dollar into their firm by purchasing new shares and
this dollar generates a permanent annual return of TT before tax or
TT(1 — rr) after the corporate tax on retained earnings. The total market
value of outstanding shares will rise at the time of the equity injection,
but it will not be affected thereafter if this net-of-tax return is used for
distributions in the form of share repurchases.
1
8 Because of the profit
distributions the investment does not generate perpetuated increments
in the market value of outstanding shares as would have been the case
had the profits been reinvested for the purpose of further internal invest-
ment. This does not mean, however, that there are no taxable capital
gains. On the contrary, since a given overall market value is divided by a
smaller number of outstanding shares, there are capital gains in every
year after the investment. The capital gains compensate for the decline
in the number of shares, and when the repurchases occur at the respec-
tive current market prices of shares, they will just equal the annual
repurchase volume TT(1—rr). The capital gains tax is therefore TCTT(1—rr)
and the shareholders' net of-all-tax return is TT(1 — TC)(1 — rr). In the opti-
mum, this return must equal the interest rate net of the personal income
tax at which shareholders could invest in the capital market, z(l—T;).
Solving for TT gives the corresponding value for the cost of capital in the
case in which new share issues are the source of finance and share
repurchases the use of profits:
Table 1 reports this (surprisingly familiar) value in the box in the first
row and fourth column.
In the second thought experiment, retained earnings in the sense of
dividend reductions are the source of finance and share repurchases the
use of profits. As explained in Section III, one dollar given up by the
shareholders via dividend cuts translates into (1 -TC)(1 - rr)/[(l - rd)(l - rdp)] dollars of investment. However, as the profits from this investment are
channelled to the shareholders via share repurchases the net return per
1
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dollar invested is TT(1—TC)(1—rr), as was shown in the previous paragraph.
Multiplying the net return per dollar of investment with the number of
dollars available for investment results in a return of TT(1—rc)
2(l—rr)
2/
[(1 — rd)(l—rdp)] for the dollar given up by the shareholder. Equating this




whereby, as mentioned in Section II, rdp = T{ in practically all OECD tax
systems. Equation (8) shows the cost of capital in the case in which
dividend cuts are the source of finance and share repurchases the use of
profits. It is represented by the box in the fourth column and second row
of Table 1.
Both equations (7) and (8) confirm the "naive" view that share repur-
chases reduce the cost of capital. The value given by (7) is exactly the
same as that which follows from the new view for the case in which
retained earnings are the source of finance and dividends the use for
marginal profits. As argued above for the U.S. tax system (rd = rr = 0.34,
Tp = 0.28, rc = 0.14) it exceeds the interest rate by only 27% versus 52% as
predicted by the "old" view formula (1).
A particularly low value of the cost of capital is implied by equation
(8). With the same U.S. tax rates, it exceeds the interest rate by just 6%.
In the pre-1986 U.S. tax system, the corporate tax rate was rd = 0.46 and
it may well have been possible that (1 —^/[(l—rc)(l—rr)] approximated
one. Under these circumstances, the cost of capital given by equation (8)
would have been about 50% below the interest rate. The reason for this
cost of capital being so low is the fact that, by reducing its dividends and
repurchasing shares, the firm can twice take advantage of the preferen-
tial tax treatment of retained compared to distributed profits. It gains
when it replaces dividends with retentions in the investment phase and
it gains when it substitutes share repurchases for dividends in the return
phase. Without preferential treatment of retained earnings, i.e., with
(1-Tc)(l-Tr) = (1-Td)(l—Tdp), equation (8) would coincide with both equa- tion (1) and equation (3).
Note that in striking contrast to the "old" view, the possibility of share
repurchases may even reverse the role of dividend taxation. According
to equation (8), a cut in the corporate tax rate on dividends—say
through the introduction of an imputation system—would actually in-
crease the cost of capital if retained earnings were the source of finance
and share repurchases the use of profits. The reason for this unusual
result is that the tax cut reduces the tax saving in the investment phase46 Sinn
but does not imply a countervailing tax relief in the phase of profit
distributions. This asymmetry induces a rational firm to invest less and
to react in the opposite way as the "old" view suggests.
B. Share Repurchases and Economic Model Building
What then is the explanation of the puzzle that holders of the "old" view
defend their results with the allusion to share repurchases?
It is simply their assumption that dividends are a fixed fraction of
profits while the remainder is used for net investment and share repur-
chases.
1
9 This seemingly innocuous assumption, which is currently
spreading fast among new models with old views, implies that new
share issues are the only marginal source of finance while dividends and
share repurchases are the use of marginal profits. The cost of capital that
the assumption generates is a weighted average of equations (1) and (7)
where the dividend-payout ratio determines the weights.
2
0
Although popular this approach is not, in this author's opinion, an
ultimately convincing response to the important phenomenon of share
repurchases. It may be a theoretical artifact with little economic meaning.
Holders of the new view could easily counter the trick by constructing
models in which share repurchases are a fixed fraction of profits and the
remainder is used for dividends and net investment. In these models,
retained earnings in the sense of dividend reductions would be the only
marginal source of finance and marginal profits would be used for share
repurchases and dividends. The cost of capital would be a weighted
average of equations (3) and (8) where the weights would again be
derived from the dividend-payout ratio.
2
1 Obviously, the cost of capital
1
9 See, e.g., Poterba and Summers (1985), Goulder and Summers (1989), or Jun (1989).
2
0 Solving the problem with an explicit dynamic optimization approach shows that the




where a is the dividend-pay-out ratio and 1-a is the fraction of profits used for share
repurchases and investment.
2
1 The exact formula following from an explicit optimization approach is
1
, (1Td)(lTdp)(lT,) 77 = I
 E • (l~Tdn)(l-Td)
(l-Tc)
2(l-rr) a - ^ + (l-a)(l-Tr)
1-TC
where 1—a is the fraction of profits used for share repurchases and a the fraction used for
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would be much lower than in the popular specification, and the per-
verted role of the dividend tax rate that equation (8) implies would still
be present.
An equally arbitrary, but less biased, assumption would be fixing the
volume of share repurchases relative to dividend payments where the
sum of these quantities exhaust the part of profits not needed for real
investment. This specification would imply that new share issues and
retained earnings are the marginal sources of finance and that share
repurchases and dividends are the uses for marginal profits. It would be
indistinguishable from a reduction of the dividend tax rate under the
"new" view and would be fully neutral since it would mean a reduced
subsidy in the investment phase, which is compensated for by a reduced
tax in the return phase. The cost of capital would be a weighted average
of the identical equations (3) and (7). It would be exactly what the "new"
view suggests.
These considerations show that the "naive" interpretation of share re-
purchases may, after all, not be all that wrong. However, from a theoreti-
cal viewpoint, there is no reason to believe that share repurchases
revalidate the "old" view of corporate taxation. On the contrary, the
possibility of share repurchases conflicts sharply with the "old" view and,
if anything, it supports the "new" view of corporate taxation. It is true that
formal models that offer the "new" view often exclude the possibility of
share repurchases. It is also true that the dividend puzzle—the question
why firms pay dividends after all—cannot really be resolved by these
models.
2
2 However, as was shown, this does not mean that the cost-of-
capital expression [equation (3)] that the "new" view offers is no longer
correct. Although this expression does not necessarily follow from the
joint observation of share repurchases and dividend payments it is per-
fectly compatible with this observation when the relative composition of
corporate distributions stays constant.
VIII. THE POLITICAL MILLER EQUILIBRIUM
The previous analysis was concerned with the economy's reaction to the
tax system; however, an equally important question is how the tax sys-
tem reacts to the economy's behavior. All countries have their histories
of tax reforms and certainly these reforms were largely introduced in
response to unforeseen and unwanted economic developments caused
by the preceding tax systems.
2
2 The new view can explain why dividend taxes do not affect the timing of dividend
payments but not why firms pay dividends instead of repurchasing shares. See Bradford
(1981, 1989), Auerbach (1983, 1989), or Sinn (1985, Ch. 4).48 Sinn
One of the major issues in capital income tax reforms has always been
the problem of financial distortions. Be it because financial reactions to
tax reforms often come fast and strong, because politicians and lobbyists
find it easier to understand financial rather than real distortions, or
because differently leveraged firms called for "fair" comparative tax treat-
ments, legislators have always paid particular attention to financial dis-
tortions and have sought to introduce tax reforms that are in harmony
with the principle of financial neutrality. As a result of this type of
behavior, many tax systems of OECD countries approximate what may
be called a political Miller equilibrium.
The term Miller equilibrium usually refers to segmentation equilibria
in which shareholders rather than legislators are the agents. However,
for the economist the term does have the connotation of an adjustment




The political Miller equilibrium is a first, albeit crude, approximation
to reality. Actual tax systems hover around the neutrality path deviating
sufficiently from it to motivate papers like this one. However, there are
forces that push the existing economies toward the Miller equilibrium
and the deviation from this equilibrium may be less than what a focus on
one country's tax system at one point in time would suggest.
Seen from an American perspective, it may seem obvious that the tax
system discriminates heavily against corporate equity. After all, the
returns to equity are taxed twice and the return to debt only once.
However, as mentioned earlier, from a worldwide perspective the pic-
ture is not as clear as that. Two of three OECD countries do not tax capital
gains realized after a holding period of more than 1 year, but four of five
countries tax dividends twice. In most countries, there is only a double
taxation of dividends, not a double taxation of corporate earnings in
general.
It is true, of course, that the number of taxes imposed on the same
base does not necessarily reveal the magnitude of the overall tax burden.
Nevertheless, the rare occurrence of capital gains taxes is a fact and it
shows that the tax discrimination against corporate equity capital may be
more an Anglo-Saxon speciality than a phenomenon with worldwide
significance. The double taxation of dividends is a worldwide phenome-
non, but it merely discriminates against a particular way of generating
equity capital, not against equity capital as such. For the vast majority of
existing firms in mature economies, a balanced tax treatment of retained
earnings and interest income is sufficient to ensure financial neutrality,
2
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and the reality may often not be far away from that. The political forces
operating toward a balanced treatment of retained earnings and interest
income have always been strong. They explain why most countries do
not have genuine capital gains taxes and why those that do offer substan-
tial reliefs such as a less than full inclusion of the gains in the personal
tax base or a taxation on realization rather than accrual.
By way of contrast, comparative forces demanding dividend tax cuts
to facilitate the foundation of new firms and avoid the distortions de-
scribed in Section VI do not seem to exist. The well-established lobbies of
mature firms do not have an interest in pushing this particular path
toward financial neutrality.
The United States, which has a long-standing tradition of double tax-
ing retained earnings, is not free from the forces driving toward a politi-
cal Miller equilibrium. In 1986, the capital gains tax base was increased
from 40 to 100% of realized gains, but in 1990, after only 4 years, the
government proposed reducing the tax burden again. At the same time,
plans were being discussed for increasing the maximum average per-
sonal tax rate (and the marginal tax rate for very high incomes) from 28
to 33%. Both moves would have been steps toward a more balanced
treatment of debt and retained profits, but the first one of them has been
ruled out by a budget compromise. The issue is almost certain to come
up again.
The 1981 U.S. tax reform can, in part, also be seen as a step toward
financial neutrality. Before 1981, rich people's income tax rates exceeded
the corporate tax rate sufficiently to create strong preferences for profit
retentions. It was the time when doctors and baseball players incorpo-
rated to enjoy the privilege of accumulating their earnings under the
rules of the corporate tax law. The 1981 reform reduced the maximum
marginal personal tax rate to 50%, just four percentage points above the
corporate tax rate, and largely abolished the preferences for retentions.
Anecdotal evidence that demonstrates the general dominance of finan-
cial over real distortions in political debates about tax reforms comes
from the discussion preceding the German tax reform of 1977. The
achievement of financial neutrality was the official goal of the reform
and detailed numerical examples demonstrating the seeming nonneutral-
ity of the previous laws were published in numerous reports and news-
paper articles. Allocative arguments focusing on real rather than finan-
cial distortions had virtually no survival chances in debate.
To make a final point, note that many countries have recently reduced
their capital income tax rates following the example of the United States.
Typically, these reductions were not limited to one tax, but included
both the personal and corporate tax rates. Surely this symmetry was50 Sinn
predominantly motivated by the attempt to avoid substantial deviations
from financial neutrality.
These reflections on the political Miller equilibrium do not imply that
there is no point in studying distortions resulting from differences in the
tax treatment of retained earnings, dividends, and interest income
where such differences occur. However, they do suggest a stylized tax
model that has the same overall tax rates on interest income and retained
profits, but allows for a discriminatory taxation of dividends. This model
may be a good first-order approximation to the tax laws of many coun-
tries and may serve well in many economic applications. It would imply
that the cost of capital for mature firms equals the market rate of interest,
and it would have various technical advantages. It would be simple and
avoid the unsatisfactory task of modelling financial constraints when
mature firms are considered. It would allow focusing on the distortion
that the double taxation of dividends causes for immature firms. And it
would pave the way for an analysis of provisions of the tax laws that
may cause more severe distortions than mere tax differentials, examples
being the ITC, accelerated depreciation allowances, accounting practices
in the presence of inflation, or discriminatory treatments of border cross-
ing interest and dividend flows.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
This paper discussed the influence of statutory capital income tax rates
on the cost of capital, starting with a comparison of the "old" and "new"
views of corporate taxation. It corrected a common misinterpretation of
the "new" view, emphasized the cushioning effect of financial optimiza-
tion, dismissed the view that firms behave as if they maximized their
cost of finance, studied the role of immature firms, questioned the al-
leged support of the old view by the occurrence of share repurchases,
and suggested the idea of a political Miller equilibrium. Various conclu-
sions emerge from the discussion.
1. For mature firms, the distortionary effects of the corporate tax may
not be very large, because they are mitigated by the firms' financial
decisions and by compensatory tax reforms that aim at establishing
conditions of financial neutrality. Seen from a worldwide perspective,
these tax reforms have reduced or even abolished the double taxation
of retained corporate profits and may have driven the allocation of
resources close to that implied by an integrated corporate tax system
(which, of course, is not free from distortionary effects either).
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tion of corporate dividends is a more severe problem than the "new"
view suggests, but does not generate the distortions exactly where
the "old" view suspects them. It is not true that firms that pay divi-
dend taxes suffer from a high cost of capital. On the contrary, those
that do not pay these taxes because they are immature and retain
their profits suffer most. The dividend tax burden expected in the
future makes it wise to economize on new share issues and to invest
even less capital than the "old" view's cost of capital formula sug-
gests. The possibility of a deferral of dividend taxes increases the cost
of outside equity finance.
3. Share repurchases are a more severe problem for the "old" view than
for the "new" view, for if they are the way through which companies
channel their marginal profits to shareholders, the cost of capital will
be equal to that implied by the "new" view or even below this value,
depending on whether new share issues or dividend cuts are the
marginal source of finance. The cost-of-capital expression resulting
from the "new" view harmonizes perfectly with share repurchases
when corporate distributions split in fixed proportions into share re-
purchases and ordinary dividend payments.
4. Under the "new" view, both an increase in the personal income tax rate
and a decrease of the personal capital gains tax rate stimulate corporate
investment demand with any given market rate of interest. In an open
economy that taxes cross-border interest income flows according to the
OECD's residence principle, the substitution of personal income taxes
for capital gains taxes results in a domestic investment boom, higher
domestic interest rates, a revaluation of the domestic currency, and a
capital import.
5. The fact that an interior debt-equity choice implies marginal costs of
debt and equity finance does not legitimate the assumption that firms
invest as if they used only equity at the margin. Despite the interior
solution, the firm's cost of capital remains between the costs of debt
and equity finance if debt and equity participate in financing marginal
investment projects.
Arguably, the first two of these results are the most important. They
suggest that tax distortions are to be found not in established corpora-
tions that currently suffer most from the high burden of dividend taxes.
They are to be found with young and immature firms and with firms
that as yet do not exist. These firms do not currently suffer from a high
tax burden, but the prospect that they will makes them overly timid in
the present. Holders of the "old" and "new" views alike have concen-
trated on the behavior of firms that pay dividends and dividend taxes.52 Sinn
How the tax system affects the foundation and development of new
firms is a question that merits equal professional attention.
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